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Proportional hazard modelIncreasingly, conﬁdential medical records are being stored in data centers hosted by hospitals or large
companies. As sophisticated algorithms for predictive analysis on medical data continue to be developed,
it is likely that, in the future, more and more computation will be done on private patient data. While
encryption provides a tool for assuring the privacy of medical information, it limits the functionality
for operating on such data. Conventional encryption methods used today provide only very restricted
possibilities or none at all to operate on encrypted data without decrypting it ﬁrst. Homomorphic encryp-
tion provides a tool for handling such computations on encrypted data, without decrypting the data, and
without even needing the decryption key.
In this paper, we discuss possible application scenarios for homomorphic encryption in order to ensure
privacy of sensitive medical data. We describe how to privately conduct predictive analysis tasks on
encrypted data using homomorphic encryption. As a proof of concept, we present a working implemen-
tation of a prediction service running in the cloud (hosted on Microsoft’s Windows Azure), which takes as
input private encrypted health data, and returns the probability for suffering cardiovascular disease in
encrypted form. Since the cloud service uses homomorphic encryption, it makes this prediction while
handling only encrypted data, learning nothing about the submitted conﬁdential medical data.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
More and more businesses and individuals conﬁde their data to
cloud services and outsource computational tasks on their data to
third-party service providers. This raises concerns about the
privacy of sensitive information since data is stored in external,
off-premise data centers. In particular in the health sector, sensi-
tive personal patient records need to be kept conﬁdential. Privacy
of sensitive information can be guaranteed, if it is encrypted by the
data owner before being uploaded to a cloud service. In that way,
only the legitimate data owner can access the data by decrypting
it using their private decryption key. But encryption limits the pos-
sibility to outsource computation on the externally stored informa-
tion, especially if the data center does not have access to the
decryption key, since the key, for standard encryption schemes,
is needed to decrypt the data so as to perform a computation upon
it. For example, a very speciﬁc task like searching an encrypted
database, without decrypting all of its entries ﬁrst, requires special
types of encryption schemes with large computational overhead,
and even a simple statistical analysis becomes impossible with
standard methods of encryption.However, exactly such computational tasks are often crucial to
the business value of maintaining databases of customer or patient
information. For example, a hospital may want to be evaluated on
its performance on the basis of its patients’ health records, but
might not want to disclose the details of all patient records. In
another example, a patient may want to use a web service that
stores and maintains all her medical records in a centralized place,
but she might not trust the cloud service to keep her private health
data conﬁdential. Still, she may want to obtain information about
her health status such as a prediction of whether or not she will
contract a speciﬁc disease.
With homomorphic encryption, many such scenarios can
be realized, because a homomorphic encryption scheme allows
computations on encrypted data without decrypting it. This means
that for example a cloud prediction service can predict the likeli-
hood of contracting a disease by only working on an encrypted
medical record. At no time during the computation is it required
to decrypt the data, and the result is produced in encrypted form.
Only after the patient receives the encrypted prediction result on a
local, private device, she decrypts to learn the prediction. This
means that the cloud service only sees data in encrypted form
and never learns any information about the encrypted data values.
Contributions. We present a working implementation of a cloud
service that demonstrates an application of outsourced prediction
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we implement predicts the chance of having a heart attack based
on a few body measurements. The service consists of a client appli-
cation on a private device and a cloud application that runs in the
Microsoft Windows Azure cloud service. The client application col-
lects user health data, encrypts it and sends the encrypted record
to the cloud application, which runs the prediction algorithm on
the encrypted record. The cloud produces an encrypted prediction
result, which it sends back to the client application. The user can
then decrypt and learn the likelihood of having a heart attack.
See Fig. 1 for a schematic overview of the implementation. The
Magma code for implementing the homomorphic encryption
schemes used here will be publicly released. A software demon-
stration is available as a live demo of the prediction service at
the link provided at the end of this article.
In addition to the implementation of the homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme and the cloud service, the main contribution of this
work is to give details of using a leveled homomorphic encryption
scheme for real-life predictive analysis. The term leveled refers to
the fact that the homomorphic encryption scheme cannot correctly
and securely carry out an arbitrary computation; instead, the
scheme can only be used to compute functions up to a certain com-
plexity, or level, that is ﬁxed in advance. Such a scheme is typically
more efﬁcient and practical than a scheme that allows arbitrary
computation, in particular if the function to be computed has low
multiplicative complexity. In this case, better performance can be
achieved by tailoring the parameters of the scheme to the speciﬁc
computation that is desired. But parameters must be set carefully
to ensure correctness and security, and these parameters depend
on the size of the function to be computed, the size of the inputs,
and the method for encoding real data. The necessity of choosing
the right parameters makes it difﬁcult to implement leveled homo-
morphic encryption for practical applications. We propose practical
methods for handling these aspects of homomorphic encryption
schemes, including a parameter selection algorithm, to realize
valuable functions occurring in predictive analysis, such as logistic
regression and Cox proportional hazard regression.We also give ref-
erences to indicate the extent to which such functions are prevalent
in predictive analytics in health care, and an overview of scenarios
for private computation where such functions are relevant.2. Scenarios for private computation on medical data
In this section, we outline a number of scenarios in which
private computation on patient medical data is desirable.Fig. 1. Cloud service for privately predicting cardiovascular disease on encrypted
medical data.Homomorphic encryption provides a potentially viable solution
for some, but not all, of these scenarios.
2.1. Patient records
Many commercial options exist today for storage and online
access to patients’ electronic medical records (EMR). In [1], patient
controlled encryption (PCE) was proposed, allowing patients to
outsource storage of their personal records in encrypted form. This
proposal included the possibility to use a hierarchical key structure
to enable sharing of keys for only selective branches of the record
(e.g. for only dental records), and a proposal to use searchable
encryption to enable the patient to privately and remotely search
the record. In [2], the authors propose using attribute-based
encryption to achieve a more ﬂexible and dynamic way to share
permissions on selective parts of an EMR. In [3], homomorphic
encryption was proposed to allow a certain amount of computa-
tion on a patient’s encrypted medical data, including for example,
data which has been uploaded in encrypted form from various
sources such as health monitors, labs or doctors. The encrypted
result of the computation can be returned to the patient for
decryption, or to any other designated party with whom the
patient has shared decryption keys, such as a doctor or family
member.
2.2. Medical databases for research
When a large amount of data from many different patients, rel-
evant to a particular disease (such as cancer) is available, building
predictive models from that data using machine learning can con-
tribute substantially to medical science and the public good. Such
models can help to identify both genetic and environmental risk
factors and to form the basis for predictive analysis. However, pri-
vacy concerns, even when the data is anonymized, need to be
weighed in the balance (see [4] for a recent study on re-identiﬁca-
tion of data in this context where certain high-proﬁle individuals
are re-identiﬁed). A recent news article in Science [5] juxtaposes
different points of view on issues of genomic privacy and summa-
rizes the approach presented here to protecting privacy while
allowing computation. Different challenges arise and different
solutions are possible depending on whether the data is publicly
available for research or whether the data is privately compiled
or controlled by a single hospital or company:
 Publicly Available Databases. This setting allows the greatest
access to the data, thereby creating the steepest privacy chal-
lenge. Differential privacy-preserving techniques are potentially
applicable. Differential privacy is implemented directly on
unencrypted data, and works by providing approximate
answers to queries to partially obscure exact information. See
[6] for an overview of differential privacy techniques. It seems
likely that differential privacy could be used to approximately
answer queries based on a publicly known trained model, how-
ever, it is less clear how well differential privacy would succeed
when building trained models with machine learning tech-
niques. Differential privacy can be considered orthogonal to
the solutions based on homomorphic encryption considered
here, since it works on plaintext data. An outstanding research
question is to design solutions which effectively combine differ-
ential privacy with homomorphic encryption in a useful way.
Another possibility for achieving anonymity is to use a syntactic
approach, which typically offers much higher data utility. The
recent paper [7]discusses the advantages and limitations of syn-
tactic approaches and differential privacy. For publicly available
databases, aside from the above, recent advances in crypto-
graphic research suggest other potential solutions for building
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multi-key homomorphic systems. In another direction, earlier
recommendations were given in [8] for protecting privacy in
population-based studies through the mechanisms of policy,
consent, and regulation.
 Privately Compiled Databases. The following two scenarios are
more suitable than the above scenario for homomorphic
encryption. Firstly, private companies developing and deploy-
ing tools for genetic research amass data through their business.
Depending on agreements with customers, they may be bound
to maintain conﬁdentiality of patient data when outsourcing
computation on such databases. Secondly, hospitals or clinics
also maintain patient records, but are bound by regulations
and patient agreements to handle this data conﬁdentially.
In both of these settings, the hospital or company may seek to
improve their business by learning from their data. A cloud ser-
vice provider can offer storage and/or analysis on this privately
held data, applying machine learning techniques to learn from
the data to build predictive models. Homomorphic encryption
allows the outsourcing of computation on the data, encrypted
under the key of the hospital or company. In [9] it was demon-
strated that basic machine learning algorithms such as the lin-
ear means classiﬁer and Fisher’s linear discriminant classiﬁer
can be performed efﬁciently to build encrypted models from
encrypted data on a small scale, although efﬁciency degrades
rapidly as the size of the database grows. So to summarize, an
untrusted cloud service can provide both training of new mod-
els ([9]) and prediction based on known models (the present
work) when given access to the data in homomorphically
encrypted form.
2.3. Direct-to-patient services
This is the application which we demonstrate in the present
paper. A cloud service may wish to offer genetic analysis or predic-
tive services over the internet without compromising the con-
sumer’s privacy. Using homomorphic encryption, it is possible to
offer conﬁdential analysis or predictive services based on a learned
predictive model. The consumer uploads the data in encrypted
form, and the cloud service computes a result in encrypted form,
which is then returned to the customer in encrypted form. The pre-
dictive model may be publicly known, as in the cardiovascular dis-
ease application we present here, or it may be a proprietary model,
learned from privately held data, such as in the scenario labeled
Privately compiled databases above. In the applications demon-
strated here, it is assumed that the predictive model is publicly
known. The next section describes a number of publicly known
models which have been developed over time to predict the likeli-
hood of various diseases.
2.4. Veriﬁability
Veriﬁability is an issue which is relevant for outsourced compu-
tation of any kind. Cryptographic schemes for verifying outsourced
computation have been proposed and are just beginning to become
practical ([10,11]). However such schemes do not apply directly to
homomorphically encrypted data in an efﬁcient way, and much
work remains to be done to effectively combine these techniques.
In many scenarios we propose, however, a naive solution is reason-
able: simply outsource computation to multiple servers and check
locally that the outputs agree once the computations are returned
and decrypted. This solution provides no guarantees against multi-
ple colluding adversaries, but makes sense when a cloud service
provider is modeled as a rational economic player who wants to
build trust in the service it provides. In that case, outsourcingmultiple copies and checking multiple computations for agree-
ment simply serves as a partial defense against accidental errors,
deletions, and denial of service attacks.3. Models for predictive analysis in health care
Over the last 50 years, a number of powerful mathematical
models have been developed, studied, and used to perform valu-
able predictive analysis in health care. In this section, we detail
common models and explain how to implement them for use with
homomorphic encryption. We focus on logistic regression and the
Cox proportional hazard model as representative examples. Logis-
tic regression has been commonly used to predict whether a
patient will suffer from a particular disease, like cardiovascular dis-
ease (CVD) [12] or diabetes [13]. Logistic regression has also been
proposed as a tool to predict the probability of survival in blunt
trauma, and has been used as the basis for calculating the Trauma
and Injury Severity Score (TRISS) for trauma audit [14].
In [15], numerous examples of medical uses of logistic regres-
sion in the study of cardiovascular disease and diabetes are noted,
including testing gender as a predictor of mortality after certain
types of heart surgery [16], correlating certain genotypes with
the risk of cardiovascular disease [17], and relating certain protein
abnormalities with occurrence of diabetes [18].
In the Framingham heart study [19], risk functions for CVDwere
calculated using various models, including linear regression, logis-
tic regression, and Cox proportional hazard regression. Linear
regression models were used to relate the risk of stroke to poor
cognitive function [20]. First the discriminant model and logistic
regression and then the Cox proportional hazard regression model
were used to build the Framingham Risk functions, which are now
widely available for predicting the likelihood of heart attacks
[19,12].
3.1. The Cox proportional hazard model
The Framingham heart study [19] followed roughly 5000
patients from Framingham, Massachusettes, for many decades
starting in 1948, adding another cohort of 5000 of their offspring
and spouses in 1971, and several other cohorts of 5000 since then.
The risk models they computed are publicly available, and we
describe some of them here. The study computed models for the
10-year risk of general cardiovascular disease (CVD), where the
population of interest consists of individuals 30–74 years old and
without CVD at the baseline examination. The 6 predictive vari-
ables (risk factors) are: age, diabetes, smoking, systolic blood pres-
sure, cholesterol, and HDL cholesterol. The predictive model for
women is given by the function
PFðfXigÞ ¼ 1 0:95012
exp
X
i
biXi26:1931
 !
;
where exp() is the exponential function, bi is the regression coefﬁ-
cient and Xi is the input for each risk factor. The risk for men is given
as
PMðfXigÞ ¼ 1 0:88936
exp
X
i
biXi23:9802
 !
:
The regression coefﬁcients for the model for women are given as
follows:X
i
biXi ¼ 2:32888  logðAÞ þ 1:20904  logðCÞ  0:70833  logðHDLÞ
þ 2:76157  logðSBPÞ þ 0:52873  Sþ 0:69154  D;
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denotes whether or not an individual is a smoker, SBP denotes
the systolic blood pressure, C denotes the cholesterol level, and
HDL denotes the HDL cholesterol level. The above risk functions
can be expressed as a Taylor series. Truncating the Taylor series
gives us a polynomial with rational coefﬁcients which can be used
to approximate the risk.
3.2. Logistic regression model
A predictive equation to screen for diabetes was developed
based on logistic regression in [13]. The equation was computed
from data on more than 1;000 Egyptian patients with no history
of diabetes. The predictive variables used were: age (a), sex, BMI,
number of hours since the last food or drink (PT: postprandial
time), and random capillary plasma glucose level (RPG). The study
was cross-validated on a sample of more than 1000 American
patients. The predictive equation calculated is
PðxÞ ¼ e
x
ex  1 ;
with the following logistic regression parameters:
x ¼ 10:0382þ 0:0331  aþ 0:0308  RPGþ 0:2500  PT
þ 0:5620  ðif femaleÞ þ 0:0346  BMI;
where age is given in years, random plasma glucose (RPG) in mg/dl,
and postprandial time (PT) in hours. Undiagnosed diabetes is pre-
dicted if the value is greater than 0:20 (20%). Thus only one digit
of accuracy is required beyond the decimal point when computing
the value of the predictive function approximately.
Logistic regression was also used to develop earlier Framing-
ham Risk Functions [12], but has been superseded in [19] by mod-
els based on Cox proportional hazard analysis. To demonstrate
logistic regression analysis, in our implementation we used the
model computed in another study, which measured only 200 male
patients, over an observation period which remains unclear [21].
The resulting logistic regression model predicted the likelihood
to have a heart attack in an unspeciﬁed period, only for men. The
six predictive variables are: age (a), height (ht), weight (wt), the
systolic blood pressure (sys), the diastolic blood pressure (dia),
and the cholesterol (chol) level. As above, the predictive model is
given by the logistic regression function
PðxÞ ¼ e
x
ex þ 1 ;
where x is the sum of the variables weighted by the logistic
regression coefﬁcients, i.e.
x ¼ 0:072  aþ 0:013  sys 0:029  diaþ 0:008  chol 0:053  ht
þ 0:021 wt:
This function can be approximated by a Taylor series
PðxÞ ¼ e
x
ex þ 1 ¼
1
2
þ 1
4
x 1
48
x3 þ 1
480
x5  17
80640
x7
þ 31
1451520
x9 þ Oðx11Þ:
Using terms in the Taylor expansion up to degree 7 we get roughly 2
digits of accuracy to the right of the decimal, which gives us an
accurate percentage.
4. Practical homomorphic encryption
In 2009, Gentry [22] proposed the ﬁrst fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE) scheme. An FHE scheme makes it possible to
encrypt data and then carry out arbitrary computations on theencrypted data by operating on ciphertexts only without the need
to decrypt the data ﬁrst, and without knowledge of the secret
decryption key. The result of the computation is given in encrypted
form and can only be decrypted by a legitimate owner of the pri-
vate decryption key. The key to allowing arbitrary computations
is that an FHE scheme allows both homomorphic addition and
multiplication operations on the encrypted data. Previous
homomorphic encryption schemes only provided one of the two
operations and therefore were not fully homomorphic. Ciphertexts
of current FHE schemes inherently contain a certain amount of
noise, which grows during homomorphic operations. This noise
‘‘pollutes’’ the ciphertext and if it grows too large, makes correct
decryption impossible, even with the legitimate decryption key.
These schemes have at their core a so-called somewhat homomor-
phic encryption scheme that can handle a certain amount of
homomorphic computation. To enable an unlimited number of
operations, ciphertexts need to be refreshed by a costly recrypt
procedure called bootstrapping.
In Gentry’s initial work and many follow-up papers, the stan-
dard way of encrypting data is bitwise. This means that the encryp-
tion procedure takes each bit of the data separately and produces a
corresponding ciphertext. Addition and multiplication of bits
(modulo 2) corresponds to bitwise XOR and AND operations and
thus allows to evaluate any boolean circuit, i.e. carry out arbitrary
computation, by ﬁrst expressing the computation in XOR and AND
gates. But breaking down a computation into bit operations can
quickly lead to a complicated and deep circuit that cannot be han-
dled by the somewhat homomorphic scheme and requires
bootstrapping.
Functions such as those presented in the previous section, how-
ever, can be approximated by polynomial expressions in integer
values, and do not necessarily need to be expressed in a bitwise
manner. Some of the more efﬁcient FHE schemes allow to encrypt
polynomials that can encode such integer values. The advantage of
this approach is that a single ciphertext now contains much more
information than just a single bit of plaintext, but restricts the pos-
sible operations to arithmetic circuits in these polynomials. Fur-
thermore, these functions are often simple enough such that the
expensive bootstrapping procedure can be avoided.
The most efﬁcient homomorphic encryption schemes of this
type (see [23–26]) operate in polynomial rings and have their secu-
rity based on hard problems in lattices, in particular the ring ver-
sion of the learning with errors problem. These often provide a
leveled homomorphic scheme, which can evaluate more initial
computation than a somewhat homomorphic scheme before boot-
strapping becomes necessary. In particular, when using a leveled
homomorphic scheme it is possible, for a given computational task,
to choose parameters that allow to evaluate the computation with
the leveled scheme without bootstrapping. The solution we use in
our implementation here is a lattice-based scheme from [26]. We
describe how the scheme works in the following subsection.4.1. The homomorphic encryption scheme
In our implementation we use the more practical variant of the
homomorphic encryption scheme recently proposed in [26,
Section 5] (it is based on the schemes from [27,28], with an
improvement from [29]). The scheme is described in a specialized
version below. It operates in the ring R ¼ Z½X=ðXn þ 1Þ for n being a
power of 2, i.e. the objects the scheme uses are all polynomials
with integer coefﬁcients of degree less than n. In particular, plain-
texts and ciphertexts are such polynomials. An element a 2 R has
the form a ¼Pn1i¼0 aiXi; ai 2 Z. Computing on elements of R means
that we add and multiply polynomials modulo Xn þ 1. The key
generation and encryption functions make use of two probability
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distribution vkey is used in key generation, in this case it is the uni-
form distribution on polynomials with coefﬁcients in f1;0;1g.
Sampling an element according to this distribution means sam-
pling all its coefﬁcients uniformly from f1;0;1g. The distribution
verr is a discrete Gaussian distribution, which is used to sample
small noise or error polynomials (the main contributing terms to
the noise inherent in ciphertexts mentioned above). For more spe-
ciﬁc details we refer to [26].The reader can simply think of ele-
ments sampled according to these distributions as polynomials in
R with small integer coefﬁcients.
The scheme is a public key encryption scheme and consists
of the following algorithms: a key generation algorithm
KeyGenðn; q; t;vkey;verrÞ that, on input the system parameters, gen-
erates a public/private key pair and an evaluation key, which is
needed for the homomorphic multiplication operation and con-
tains information about the private key in encrypted form; an
encryption algorithm Encryptðh;mÞ that encrypts a message m
using the public key h; a decryption algorithm Decryptðf ; cÞ that
decrypts a ciphertext cwith the private key f and returns the plain-
text message m that was encrypted in c; a homomorphic addition
function Addðc1; c2Þ that produces a ciphertext encrypting the sum
m1 þm2 2 R=tR modulo t from two ciphertexts c1 and c2, encrypt-
ing the messages m1 and m2, respectively; and ﬁnally a homomor-
phic multiplication function that, given encryptions of m1 and m2,
outputs a ciphertext encrypting the product m1m2 modulo t. In
more detail, these algorithms are given below. Note that some
operations reduce coefﬁcients of polynomials in R modulo an inte-
ger modulus q, this operation is denoted by ½q. The plaintext space
for encrypting is R=tR, i.e. polynomials in R with coefﬁcients
reduced modulo the integer plaintext modulus t < q. This means
that data to be encrypted must be encoded as a polynomial ½mt
(for m 2 R) with coefﬁcients reduced modulo t. The number bq=tc
is the largest integer not exceeding q=t.
 KeyGenðn; q; t;vkey;verrÞ: On input the degree n and moduli q and
t, the key generation algorithm samples small polynomials
f 0; g  vkey from the key distribution and sets f ¼ ½tf 0 þ 1q. If f
is not invertible modulo q, it chooses a new f 0. It computes
h ¼ ½tgf1q, where f1 2 R is the inverse of f modulo q, and out-
puts the public and private key pair ðpk; skÞ ¼ ðh; f Þ 2 R2
together with an evaluation key evk 2 Rdlog2ðqÞe that is used in
the homomorphic multiplication algorithm. For more details
see [26, Section 6].
 Encryptðh;mÞ: The encryption algorithm samples small error
polynomials s; e verr, and outputs the ciphertext
c ¼ ½bq=tc½mt þ eþ hsq 2 R.
 Decryptðf ; cÞ: Given a ciphertext c and the private decryption key
f, the decryption algorithm computes m ¼ tq  ½fcq
j mh i
t
2 R.
 Addðc1; c2Þ: Given two ciphertexts c1 and c2, output the cipher-
text cadd ¼ ½c1 þ c2q.
 Multðc1; c2; evkÞ: Given two ciphertexts c1 and c2 and the evalu-
ation key evk, compute ~cmult ¼ tq c1c2
j mh i
q
and output
KeySwitchð~cmult; evkÞ, where the key switching function
KeySwitch is needed to transform the ciphertext so that it can
be decrypted with the original secret key. Again, for more
details, we refer to [26].
4.2. Encoding real numbers
For the applications described in Section, it is necessary to
encode real numbers as elements of the encryption scheme’s plain-
text space. As mentioned above, recent papers [22,29] presentinghomomorphic encryption schemes usually assume that the data
to be encoded and encrypted is handled bitwise, with a separate
ciphertext for each bit (or sometimes with an optimization to pack
many bits into each ciphertext as ﬁrst described in [30] and used in
[31]). But for example representing integers as a collection of bits
requires a deep circuit just to do a simple integer multiplication
when done bitwise. Before we describe how to encode real num-
bers, let us ﬁrst consider integer values only. We use a technique
for encoding integers which has already been described in [3]
and has been used for machine learning algorithms in [9]. An inte-
ger is encoded as a polynomial m 2 R=tR (for the deﬁnition of R=tR
see Section 4.1) via its bit representation. Namely, let z 2 Z be an
integer and let z ¼ ð1ÞPli¼0zi2i; zi 2 f0;1g be its binary represen-
tation, where l ¼ blog2ðjzjÞc þ 1. Then, as long as l < n one can
encode the plaintext message z as the polynomial
m ¼ ð1ÞPli¼0ziXi. Such a polynomial can be decoded to give back
an integer by evaluating it at 2, i.e. z ¼ mð2Þ. For example, the inte-
ger 11 is encoded as the polynomial 1þ X þ X3.
With this encoding, integer multiplication corresponds to direct
multiplication of polynomials whenever t is large enough such that
the coefﬁcients of the resulting polynomial are all smaller than t
and its degree does not exceed the maximal degree of polynomials
in the ring used in the scheme. The latter two conditions need to be
ensured, because homomorphic multiplication corresponds to
multiplication of polynomials in R=tR. This is a polynomial
multiplication followed by reductions modulo the ring polynomial
Xn þ 1 to reduce the degree below n and modulo t in the coefﬁ-
cients of the result. If these conditions are satisﬁed, a homomorphic
multiplication of two ciphertexts corresponds directly to multipli-
cation of the encrypted integers, not requiring a deep circuit to
execute. Note that the internal representation of integers during
and after a computation is redundant in that polynomials will rep-
resent integers via a 2-adic representation as above, but possibly
with integer coefﬁcients larger other than 0 or 1, depending on
the speciﬁc computation. This does not change the fact that evalu-
ation at 2 yields the corresponding integer result that is encoded by
the polynomial. For example, the polynomial 3þ X þ 3X2 also
encodes the integer 3þ 2þ 3  22 ¼ 11 and could be the result
of a computation on polynomials with binary coefﬁcients.
Using the encoding technique for integers, we can now encode
real numbers that are approximated to a given precision by
rational numbers. For the entire computation, a ﬁxed precision is
chosen in advance, and real numbers at that precision are scaled
by the corresponding factor, e.g. a power of 10 or a power of 2,
to make them integers, which are then encoded as just described.
At the end of the computation and after decryption, the result is
converted back to a real number by dividing by that power of 10.
How much precision is needed, depends on the accuracy required
in the answer and on the complexity of the function to be com-
puted. Also, the fact that we work with multiples of the actual data
needs to be accounted for in the computation, which might have to
be adjusted to produce the desired results.
The restriction to arithmetic circuits in R together with our
encoding of numbers also means that we cannot carry out divisions
of integers or real numbers. To avoid such divisions in our opera-
tions on encrypted data, we assume that our function is approxi-
mated by a polynomial with rational coefﬁcients and that it is
normalized by multiplying by an integer to clear all denominators.
After decryption, the answer can be divided by the same integer to
obtain the result.4.3. How to set parameters
In practice, it is not necessary to use homomorphic encryption
schemes that can handle arbitrary large amounts of computation
Table 1
We give two sets of parameters, P1 and P2 , for choices of integer moduli q and t and
the degree n in R ¼ Z½X=ðXn þ 1Þ. Parameter set P1 is chosen to allow the computation
of the exponent in the logistic regression function. P2 is chosen to allow the
computation of the Taylor series up to degree 7, to approximate the output of the
logistic regression function. Both sets provide 80 bits of security, which means that
the algorithms to break the scheme that are considered in [26] take time at least 280.
log2ðqÞ t n
P1 128 210 212
P2 512 240 214
Table 2
Performance results for the core operations used in our homomorphic encryption
using parameter set P1 and P2 . The results are expressed in milliseconds. These results
were obtained on a laptop (Intel Core i7-3520M at 2893.484 MHz).
Operation P1 P2
Encryption 13 577
Decryption 11 549
Addition of ciphertexts <1 1
Multiplication of ciphertexts 39 5056
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earlier, which can be realized using the extremely costly bootstrap-
ping step from Gentry’s blueprint [22]). Instead, the required func-
tionality can be achieved by choosing a leveled homomorphic
scheme and ﬁne-tuning the parameters to the speciﬁc computation,
such that security and correctness are guaranteed. This leads to a
more efﬁcient scheme, but only allows for a ﬁnite amount of com-
putation on encrypted data. The security requirement demands
that the best known attacks to break the encryption scheme take
at least a certain amount of time ﬁxed in advance (also referred
to as the security level). From that, bounds on the parameters are
deduced to ensure this requirement. For a given desired amount
of computation, the correctness condition is derived from the inher-
ent noise growth, and also leads to bounds on the parameters,
which have to be met to ensure that the inherent noise does not
grow too large and decryption still works correctly. A combination
of these two conditions leads to concrete intervals from which the
parameters need to be chosen. The amount of computation allowed
for a given parameter set, while still ensuring correctness and secu-
rity, is ﬁxed in advance, and depends on the size of the inputs and
the complexity of the function to be computed, as well as on the
homomorphic encryption scheme.
For the particular function considered here, we estimate the
parameters based on the analysis given in the theorems and
appendices of [26]. This approach is particularly well-suited for
the application described here, direct-to-patient services, where
there is a ﬁxed function to be computed and a ﬁxed amount of data
input from the patient. Also, there is a cost to the above approach
to encoding integers which we now explain. Our method of encod-
ing allows for multiplication of integers but not division, thus the
need to clear denominators to avoid fractions. We also need to
ensure that our parameters are set large enough so that the com-
putation on the encoded integers does not correspond to polyno-
mials with coefﬁcients exceeding the modulus t. If a reduction
modulo t occurs in the plain text space, the computation does
not represent the corresponding integer operations any more. Thus
we set t to be a large power of 2, to allow for the coefﬁcients of
polynomials representing the results to grow that large. As t grows,
to maintain security we must increase both the size of the modulus
q, which determines the coefﬁcient space for the polynomial ring,
and the dimension of the lattice, which determines the degree of
the polynomials to be handled. The performance of the scheme is
proportional to the cost of multiplying polynomials in this polyno-
mial ring, thus performance degrades as the complexity of the
function and the size of the input grows. We follow the analysis
in [26] and present two parameter sets in Table 1 that allow differ-
ent amounts of computation. While the ﬁrst parameter set P1 only
allows a quadratic polynomial in the input data to be correctly
evaluated, the second parameter set P2 can be used to evaluate
polynomials of higher degree (such as 8).
5. Performance numbers
Due to the simple function we compute, and the small amount
of data computed on, we have been able to implement a practicalversion of the homomorphic encryption scheme presented in [26].
As becomes clear from Table 1, even the small parameter set P1
requires computation with relatively large polynomials (in this
case degree 4096) where each coefﬁcient is of size 128 bits. When
computing with such large polynomials it makes sense to switch
from methods based on ‘‘schoolbook’’ multiplication (with run-
time complexity Oðn2Þ for degree n polynomials) to computation
of the discrete Fourier transform using the fast Fourier transform
(FFT) [32] (with a run-time complexity Oðn lognÞ of arithmetic
operations). Due to the special shape of the ring we use,
R ¼ Z½X=ðXn þ 1Þ, where n ¼ 2m is a power of 2, we can use the
FFT algorithm by Nussbaumer [33] based on recursive negacyclic
convolution (see [34, Exercise 4.6.4.59] for more details). The neg-
acyclic convolution of two sequences ðx0; x1; . . . ; x2m1Þ and
ðy0; y1; . . . ; y2m1Þ is the sequence ðz0; z1; . . . ; z2m1Þ with
zk ¼ x0yk þ . . .þ xky0  ðxkþ1y2m1 þ . . .þ x2m1ykþ1Þ:
Note that computing such a negacyclic convolution is equivalent to
polynomial multiplication modulo X2
m þ 1 (where the different xk
are regarded as coefﬁcients of a polynomial). The novelty of this
algorithm is that it performs an FFT on the coefﬁcient polynomials,
see [35] for more details. Note that other asymptotic fast multipli-
cation algorithms can be used as well, examples are the Schönhage–
Strassen algorithm [36] or any other multiplication methods based
on a number theoretic transform. We choose the algorithm from
[33] since it is especially efﬁcient for computations in Z½X=ðXn þ 1Þ.
We implemented and deployed the homomorphic scheme from
[26] as a cloud service to compute on encrypted data, where we fol-
low the steps as outlined in Fig. 1 and we show a scenario which is
typical of functions used for predictive analysis in health care. We
have benchmarked the various core operations of this scheme on
a modern laptop (Intel Core i7-3520M at 2893.484 MHz), the per-
formance results are summarized in Table 2. All these core opera-
tions are stated in terms of milliseconds and can be considered
practical. The encryption and decryption operations are performed
by the user before and after sending the data to the cloud. The cloud
receives the encrypted data, performs the additions andmultiplica-
tions on this data in encrypted form, and sends the encrypted result
back to the client. The size of the encrypted data is relatively large:
using the parameters P1, a single encrypted value is 64 kilobytes
(4096 coefﬁcients of 128-bit). Thus the communication overhead
with the cloud service provider (Microsoft’s Windows Azure) dom-
inates the time spent in the entire computation. In practice the tim-
ings for outsourcing the computation vary from less than a second
up to two seconds: this is signiﬁcantly more than the time spent on
encrypting, decrypting and computing on the data, but still practi-
cal. Note that when using the parameter set P2, the size of one
ciphertext grows to roughly one megabyte (16384 coefﬁcients of
512-bit). In that case, the network overhead is more signiﬁcant,
but the computation cost is also greater since a multiplication of
ciphertexts requires around ﬁve seconds with this scheme. Overall,
computing the Taylor series up to degree 7 takes more than
30 seconds since computing the powers of x already requires 6
multiplications at 5 seconds each. Given that all other operations
in the outsourced computation are rather cheap, the overall
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head is signiﬁcantly below 1 minute.
Note that in our performance numbers based on the scheme in
[26], the homomorphic multiplication operation includes a costly
key switching step that increases the time for homomorphic multi-
plication, while decreasing the size of ciphertexts. It guarantees
that ciphertexts do not grow and are decryptable by the original
secret key. Thus there is a trade-off to consider when evaluating
low-degree polynomials homomorphically, as in our current sce-
nario. Namely, using a different scheme such as the one in [24]
could result in signiﬁcantly faster homomorphic multiplication, at
the cost of allowing ciphertexts to grow during homomorphic mul-
tiplication. For a low-degree computation, it might not be beneﬁcial
to implement the modulus switching technique that is required for
deeper circuits. Thus, overall, homomorphic multiplication might
be signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient than the timings here suggest.
In a recent work [37] the homomorphic encryption scheme
used here was also implemented. See [37] for performance details
and the publicly available C++ software implementation.
6. Automatic parameter selection module
The above discussion makes clear that an important aspect of
designing such a system is the selection of appropriate parameters
for implementing the homomorphic encryption scheme to ensure
its security and correctness for the computation to be performed.
We propose an automatic parameter selection module which com-
putes these parameters. For the reasons explained in Section 4, we
assume that the function to be computed is approximated by a poly-
nomial with rational coefﬁcients. And we assume also that denomi-
nators are cleared to transform the function into a polynomial with
integer coefﬁcients, that the amount of real precision that is
required for the computation is ﬁxed, and all real numbers are
scaled to integers corresponding to that amount of precision. Then
the module selects parameters depending on the following inputs:
1. the choice of a homomorphic encryption scheme,
2. the degree of the normalized polynomial to be evaluated and
the size of its coefﬁcients,
3. the size of the scaled inputs.
In this work, we use the more practical variant of the scheme
from [26], but a similar analysis also applies to related schemes
(e.g. the one in [25]).
In certain application scenarios for homomorphic encryption,
the function to be computed might be proprietary. In that case,
the parameters for the encryption scheme need to be provided
by the function owner, along with speciﬁed bounds on the size of
allowable inputs. We cannot accurately estimate the correct
parameters without knowing the degree of the polynomia that is
being evaluated and the size of its coefﬁcients. Thus, for the
remainder of our discussion and the detailed analysis of the func-
tion implemented in this paper, we assume that the function to be
evaluated on encrypted data is public. This means that all its poly-
nomial coefﬁcients are known and each scalar multiplication can
be implemented as an optimized sequence of additions of cipher-
texts. The steps of parameter setting are as follows.
6.1. Correctness
First, the plaintext modulus t must be chosen large enough such
that it is bigger than the coefﬁcients of the polynomial that
encodes the integer result of the computation. This is important
in order to guarantee that they are not reduced modulo t to
something smaller. If integers are encoded as polynomials with
binary coefﬁcients (in the way shown in Section 4.2), then addingsuch a polynomial to itself s times results in a polynomial with
integer coefﬁcients at most s, where the degree of the polynomial
remains the same. More general, when adding s polynomials with
coefﬁcients of size at most B, then the resulting polynomial has
coefﬁcients of size at most sB and its degree is the same. In contrast
to the addition operation, multiplication of such polynomials
results in much faster coefﬁcient growth due to the multiplication
of cross-terms. Note also that the degrees of the polynomials being
multiplied add up to the degree of the product polynomial. So, how
large do these coefﬁcients get after L levels of multiplications, i.e.
when evaluating a polynomial function (or a monomial) on
encrypted data of degree 2L? When starting with integers less than
2d that are encoded as binary polynomials (of degree d), the
coefﬁcients of the resulting polynomial can be as large as
d2
L122
LL1, and its degree can be up to 2Lðd 1Þ. Thus, to receive
a meaningful result which reﬂects the actual computation on inte-
gers, we need to ensure that t > d2
L122
LL1, and also that the
degree n is chosen large enough so as to be greater than
2Lðd 1Þ. In fact, to evaluate a function represented by a polyno-
mial of degree 2L, we need to choose t somewhat larger than this
bound to account for the scalar multiplications and additions.
As mentioned in Section 4, in most lattice-based encryption
schemes, encryption involves adding noise, in the form of an error
vector or error polynomial, to a (possibly noisy) inner product;
thus the reason for the name of the hardness assumption learning
with errors (LWE). As ciphertexts are added and multiplied, the
noise term contained in the resulting ciphertexts grows. At the
end of the computation, the overall noise must be small enough
to still allow for correct decryption. This means that it must be
small enough compared to the ratio of q to t;D ¼ bq=tc, in particu-
lar for the scheme we consider here, roughly less than D=2 (see [26,
Lemma 1]).
So for a given initial noise size and a given degree of the poly-
nomial to be evaluated, the ratio of q to t has to be large enough
to allow the amount of noise growth incurred by the computation.
For given t and n, the size of the initial noise and a ﬁxed number of
levels of multiplications, using [26, Theorem 4 and Lemma 4] we
can estimate the size of the resulting noise, and we can then set
q large enough to allow for correct decryption ([26, Theorem 5]).
We give more details below.6.2. Security
In addition to the above conditions to guarantee correctness,
there is a delicate balance between these parameters q; t;n and
the size of the noise to achieve the desired security. The best
known attacks on lattice-based systems work by ﬁnding a short
vector in a lattice. One can use such a short vector to distinguish
pairs of uniform random ring elements from LWE samples. To dis-
tinguish an instance of the LWE problem from uniform random
with advantage , an attacker needs to ﬁnd a vector of length at
most aðq=rÞ, where a is a constant which depends on  and r is
the standard deviation of the error distribution. Thus for a given
security requirement, the shortest vector obtained through the
best lattice reduction algorithms must be longer than a vector
which could give an adversary a non-negligible advantage in the
Ring-LWE distinguishing problem. This gives us an inequality
which must be satisﬁed involving q;n, and r (see [26, Appendix
K] for more details and the precise inequality, and [37, Section 3]
for a more recent approach). In our example here (as in [26,
Table 1]), we calculate parameters to achieve 80 bits of security,
allowing a distinguishing advantage of 280.
Taking into account all the bounds and requirements to achieve
correctness and security for homomorphically evaluating a given
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eter selection module which determines the minimum parameters
as required.
6.3. Algorithm to select parameters for a computation under
homomorphic encryption
We outline an algorithm that works for the evaluation of poly-
nomials in one variable. With slight alterations, the algorithm can
be generalized to the case of multivariate polynomials. Let
FðzÞ ¼Pdegi¼0cizi; ci 2 Z be the polynomial function to be evaluated
under the homomorphic encryption scheme.
Input:
1. deg: the degree of FðzÞ, the polynomial to be evaluated on
encrypted data, i.e. deg < 2L,
2. s: the maximum of the coefﬁcients of FðzÞ, i.e. ci < s, for all i,
3. d: the size of integers to be handled, i.e. all inputs are integers z
with absolute value less than 2d, encoded as polynomials with
binary coefﬁcients,
4. k: the desired security level, i.e. the best lattice attack runs in
time > 2k and distinguishes with advantage less than 2k,
5. r: the standard deviation r for the error distribution, typically
r ¼ 8, determining the bound on the error distribution, Berr ,
typically 6r,
6. Bkey: the bound on the key distribution, which can be chosen to
be 1 in practice,
7. w: the word size for the evaluation key, for example w ¼ 232,
8. d: the expansion factor, which is d ¼ n since n is a power of 2.
Output: parameters ðt; q;nÞ for the homomorphic encryption
scheme that ensure correctness and security.
Stage 1 In the ﬁrst stage, set t large enough to allow for correct-
ness of operations modulo t, i.e. such that no reductions modulo t
occur in the coefﬁcients of the plaintext polynomials. For multipli-
cations only, the condition on t is t > d2
L1  22LL1, as explained
above. However, to evaluate the polynomial FðzÞ ¼Pdegi¼0ci  zi, we
also need additions of ciphertexts. Here, the zi correspond to
polynomials with coefﬁcients less than d2
L1  22LL1. These zi are
multiplied by a scalar which is at most s and then these deg terms
are added together, so the resulting coefﬁcients are at most
s  deg d2L1  22LL1 < s  2L  d2L1  22LL1 ¼ s  d2L1  22L1:
So set
t > s  d2L1  22L1:
Note that this assumes a naive way of multiplying by scalars. We
also need to keep in mind that for multiplications to represent inte-
ger multiplications, we need the degree condition n > 2L  ðd 1Þ to
avoid reductions in the ring modulo Xn þ 1.
Stage 2 In this stage, we estimate the error growth to ensure
correctness. Assume that t was chosen in Stage 1 and is now ﬁxed.
The ﬁnal size e of the error must be less than D=2, where D ¼ bq=tc,
so set q such that 2e < D which means that we roughly have
q > 2e  t. Theorem 4 and Lemma 4 in [26] show that multiplication
of two ciphertexts with noise of size V results in a ciphertext with
noise of size E, where
E < dtð4þ dtBkeyÞV þ d2t2BkeyðBkey þ tÞ þ d2tlogwðqÞwBerrBkey:
In order to evaluate the function FðzÞ, which has degree deg < 2L,
we carry out at most deg additions of terms of degree less than
2L. Using the lower bound on D from [26, Theorem 5], and taking
into account the noise growth resulting from the additions andcoefﬁcients of FðzÞ, we get the following lower bound on q to ensure
correctness:
q > 2t  s  deg ð1þ 1ÞL1n2Lt2L1BLkey
 ð1þ 1Þnt2Bkeyð2Berr þ t=2Þ þ LðtðBkey þ tÞ þ logwðqÞwBerrÞ
 
;
where 1 ¼ 4ðdtBkeyÞ1, V has been replaced by the upper bound
dtBkeyð2Berr þ t=2Þ on the noise in a fresh ciphertext (see [26,
Lemma 2]) and we have used d ¼ n. Here, we see the dependence
on d ¼ n in the noise bound that determines the bound on q. To
satisfy security requirements, nmust bemuch smaller than q. At this
point, we can ﬁx an initial value for n, for example n ¼ 212, then set q
according to the bound just given, and then proceed to the next stage
to check that the bounds implied by security are satisﬁed.
Unfortunately, the above bound is not completely independent
of q because of the term logwðqÞ. In practice, we choose w with
respect to the expected size of q such that this term is rather small,
so we can treat the bound as a lower bound on q. However, it
should be checked with the concrete chosen parameters in the end.
Stage 3 In this stage, we assure that the desired security level is
met. To distinguish with an advantage of  in the RLWE problem,
an adversary is required to ﬁnd vectors of length at most
a  ðq=rÞ where a ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
lnð1=Þ=p
p
. In our speciﬁc parameter exam-
ples, we use  ¼ 280, which results in a  4:201. We refer to
[37] for a more complete description of a distinguishing attack
and the precise lattices we are required to ﬁnd short vectors in.
Section 3 in [37] describes in detail a parameter selection approach
that uses a simulation algorithm for the currently most efﬁcient
lattice-basis reduction algorithm BKZ 2.0 presented in [38]. To ﬁnd
a short vector in the n-dimensional target lattice, it is embedded
into a lattice of higher dimension m > n. For given m and a ﬁxed
security level k (e.g. k ¼ 80), this method determines the minimal
root-Hermite factor cðmÞ that can be achieved running BKZ 2.0
for time 2k. The factor cðmÞ determines the size of the shortest
vector that can be found with that speciﬁc setting of the BKZ 2.0
algorithm, which is cðmÞm  qn=m. To distinguish with advantage ,
one needs cðmÞm  qn=m ¼ a  ðq=rÞ. This means that for security
we require (see [37, Section 3.3])
log2ðqÞ 6minm>n
m2  log2ðcðmÞÞ þm  log2ðr=aÞ
m n ;
and in terms of q, this yields
q 6 qmaxðn; Þ :¼ minm>n 2
m2 log2 ðcðmÞÞþmlog2ðr=aÞ
mn :
In order to determine qmaxðn; Þ, various cðmÞ values for different
security levels and dimensions can be found in [37, Table 1].
Stage 4 In this ﬁnal stage, we combine the bounds from the pre-
vious two stages to choose n and q. The computations in Stages 2
and 3 yield an upper and lower bound on q, both of which involve
n. To ensure a simultaneous solution, we set n to a power of two
such that
qmaxðn; Þ > 2t  s  deg ð1þ 1ÞL1d2Lt2L1BLkey
 ð1þ 1Þdt2Bkeyð2Berr þ t=2Þ

þ LðtðBkey þ tÞ þ logwðqÞwBerrÞ

;
i.e. such that we get a non-trivial interval for q. Finally, we select an
appropriate q in this interval.
6.3.1. Example
Using the model for predicting the likelihood of having a heart
attack given in [21], and normalizing the functions and inputs as
described above, we evaluate the function
FðzÞ ¼ 17z7 þ 168z5  1680z3 þ 20160zþ 40320;
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z ¼ 72  aþ 13  sys 29  diaþ 8  chol 53  htþ 21 wt:
Inputs to z are encoded as polynomials as described above.
The input to F is the sum of 6 scaled values, where the scalars
are all less than 72 and the inputs are at most 400. So each input
can be represented as a polynomial of degree at most 8 with binary
coefﬁcients, and each scalar multiplication can be achieved
through at most 72 additions. So the result is represented by a
ciphertext corresponding to a polynomial of degree at most 8 with
coefﬁcients at most 6  72, and taking into account the error growth
for homomorphic additions, the computation of the input to the
function F can be achieved with a small value of t, for example
t ¼ 210 will sufﬁce.
The input to the function F is at most 6  72  400 (which is an
overestimate), and could thus be represented as a polynomial of
degree at most d ¼ blog2ð6  72  400Þc ¼ 17 with binary coefﬁ-
cients. But since this input is not a freshly encrypted ciphertext,
i.e. is not a freshly encoded integer, its coefﬁcients may already
be larger. Namely, the output of the homomorphic additions in
the ﬁrst step result in a ciphertext corresponding to a polynomial
of degree 8 with coefﬁcients up to size 432. Also, this corresponds
to an integer which is 1000 times what the actual input is sup-
posed to be, so the coefﬁcients of F need to be scaled to account
for this, making them even larger once they are normalized. One
alternative is to have the client reencrypt the input to the function
F. If the client inputs a freshly encrypted value for x where the
ciphertext is represented as a polynomial of degree at most
d ¼ 17 with binomial coefﬁcients, then to evaluate the function F
on this input requires 3 levels of multiplication, so using the lower
bound on t for L ¼ 3 given above, t > 8d7, we see that to achieve
correctness for this computation we need to set t to be at least
t ¼ 232.7. Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrated a working implementation of a
cloud service for performing private predictive analysis tasks on
encrypted health data using homomorphic encryption. The cloud
service makes predictions while handling only encrypted data,
learning nothing about the submitted conﬁdential medical data.
In addition to the efﬁcient implementation of the homomorphic
encryption scheme and the cloud service, the main contribution
of this work is to give details of using a practical homomorphic
encryption scheme for real-life predictive analysis. Namely, we
propose an automatic parameter selection module for determining
safe parameters for the practical homomorphic encryption scheme
to assure correctness and security of the results when evaluating
functions used in predictive analysis such as logistic regression
and Cox proportional hazard regression. We also indicate the
extent to which such functions are prevalent in predictive analytics
in health care, and provide an overview of scenarios for private
computation where such functions are relevant. Future work will
focus on improving the performance and increasing the scalability
of systems to operate on encrypted health data. This includes
improving the performance of practical homomorphic encryption
schemes at scale and enlarging the class of functions which practi-
cal homomorphic encryption schemes can successfully evaluate.
Software demonstration: A live demo of the prediction service is
available at the link given in [39].
Acknowledgments
We thank Craig Costello, Robert Dunnill, and Seny Kamara for
help in preparing the demo, Adriana Lopez-Alt for comments onan earlier draft, and the anonymous referees for helpful sugges-
tions to improve the exposition.References
[1] Benaloh J, Chase M, Horvitz E, Lauter K. Patient controlled encryption: ensuring
privacy of electronic medical records. In: Proceedings of the ﬁrst ACM cloud
computing security workshop – CCSW. ACM; 2009. p. 103–14.
[2] Narayan S, Gagné M, Safavi-Naini R. Privacy preserving EHR system using
attribute-based infrastructure. In: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM cloud
computing security workshop – CCSW. ACM; 2010. p. 47–52.
[3] Lauter K, Naehrig M, Vaikuntanathan V. Can homomorphic encryption be
practical? In: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM cloud computing security workshop
– CCSW. ACM; 2011. p. 113–24.
[4] Gymrek M, McGuire AL, Golan D, Halperin E, Erlich Y. Identifying personal
genomes by surname inference. Science 2013;339(6117):321–4.
[5] Sumner T. How to hide your genome, ScienceNow. http://
news.sciencemag.org/biology/2014/02/how-hide-your-genome; 2014.
[6] Dwork C. A ﬁrm foundation for private data analysis. ACM Commun
2011;54(1):86–95.
[7] Clifton C, Tassa T. On syntactic anonymity and differential privacy. In: Chan CY,
Lu J, Nørvåg K, Tanin E, editors. ICDE workshops. IEEE Computer Society; 2013.
p. 88–93.
[8] Simon GE, Unützer J, Young BE, Pincus HA. Large medical databases,
population-based research, and patient conﬁdentiality. Am J Psychiatry
2000;157(11):1731–7.
[9] Graepel T, Lauter K, Naehrig M. ML conﬁdential: machine learning on
encrypted data. In: Kwon T, Lee M-K, Kwon D, editors. Information security
and cryptology – ICISC. Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 7839. Springer;
2012. p. 1–21.
[10] Gennaro R, Gentry C, Parno B. Non-interactive veriﬁable computing:
outsourcing computation to untrusted workers. In: Rabin T, editor. CRYPTO.
Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 6223. Springer; 2010. p. 465–82.
[11] Parno B, Howell J, Gentry C, Raykova M. Pinocchio: nearly practical veriﬁable
computation. In: IEEE symposium on security and privacy. IEE Computer
Society; 2013. p. 238–52.
[12] D’Agostino RB, Pencina MJ, Massaro JM, Coady S. Cardiovascular disease risk
assessment: insights from Framingham. Global Heart 2013;8(1):11–23.
[13] Tabaei BP, Herman WH. A multivariate logistic regression equation to screen
for diabetes development and validation. Diabetes Care 2002;25(11):
1999–2003.
[14] Boyd CR, Tolson M-A, Copes WS. Evaluating trauma care: the TRISS method. J
Trauma Acute Care Surgery 1987;27(4):370–8.
[15] LaValley MP. Logistic regression. Circulation 2008;117(18):2395–9.
[16] Blankstein R, Ward RP, Arnsdorf M, Jones B, Lou Y-B, Pine M. Female gender is
an independent predictor of operative mortality after coronary artery bypass
graft surgery contemporary analysis of 31 midwestern hospitals. Circulation
2005;112(Suppl. 9):323–7.
[17] Boekholdt S, Sacks FM, Jukema JW, Shepherd J, Freeman DJ, McMahon AD,
et al. Cholesteryl ester transfer protein TaqIB variant, high-density lipoprotein
cholesterol levels, cardiovascular risk, and efﬁcacy of pravastatin treatment.
Circulation 2005;111(3):278–87.
[18] Festa A, Williams K, Hanley AJ, Otvos JD, Goff DC, Wagenknecht LE, et al.
Nuclear magnetic resonance lipoprotein abnormalities in prediabetic subjects
in the insulin resistance atherosclerosis study. Circulation 2005;111(25):
3465–72.
[19] D’Agostino RB, Vasan RS, Pencina MJ, Wolf PA, Cobain M, Massaro JM, et al.
General cardiovascular risk proﬁle for use in primary care: the Framingham
Heart Study. Circulation 2008;117(6):743–53.
[20] Llewellyn DJ, Lang IA, Xie J, Huppert FA, Melzer D, Langa KM. Framingham
stroke risk proﬁle and poor cognitive function: a population-based study. BMC
Neurol 2008;8(1):12.
[21] Flowers C. RSCH 8140 – Multivariate Statistics (Doctoral). http://
coedpages.uncc.edu/cpﬂower/rsch8140/logisticregressionexample.htm; 2013.
[22] Gentry C, Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. In: STOC; 2009.
p. 169–78.
[23] Brakerski Z, Vaikuntanathan V. Fully homomorphic encryption from ring-LWE
and security for key dependent messages. In: Rogaway P, editor. Advances in
cryptology – CRYPTO. Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 6841; 2011. p.
505–24.
[24] Brakerski Z, Gentry C, Vaikuntanathan V. Fully homomorphic encryption
without bootstrapping. Electr Colloquium Comput Complex (ECCC)
2011;18:111.
[25] Fan J, Vercauteren F. Somewhat practical fully homomorphic encryption.
Cryptology ePrint archive, report 2012/144. <http://eprint.iacr.org/; 2012.
[26] Bos JW, Lauter K, Loftus J, Naehrig M. Improved security for a ring-based fully
homomorphic encryption scheme. In: Stam M, editor. Cryptography and
coding – 14th IMA international conference, IMACC 2013. Lecture notes in
computer science, vol. 8308. Springer; 2013. p. 45–64.
[27] Stehle D, Steinfeld R. Making NTRU as secure as worst-case problems over
ideal lattices. In: Advances in cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2011 – 30th
annual international conference on the theory and applications of
cryptographic techniques. Lecture notes in computer science, vol.
6632. Springer; 2011. p. 27.
J.W. Bos et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 234–243 243[28] López-Alt A,Tromer E, Vaikuntanathan V. On-the-ﬂy multiparty computation
on the cloud via multikey fully homomorphic encryption. In: STOC; 2012.
p. 1219–34.
[29] Brakerski Z. Fully homomorphic encryption without modulus switching from
classical GapSVP. In: Advances in cryptology – crypto 2012. Lecture notes in
computer science, vol. 7417. Springer; 2012. p. 868–86.
[30] Smart N, Vercauteren F. Fully homomorphic SIMD operations, designs, codes
and cryptography; 2012. p. 1–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10623-012-9720-4.
[31] Gentry C, Halevi S, Smart NP. Homomorphic evaluation of the AES circuit. In:
Advances in cryptology – crypto 2012. Lecture notes in computer science, vol.
7417. Springer; 2012. p. 850–67.
[32] Cooley JW, Tukey JW. An algorithm for the machine calculation of complex
Fourier series. Math Comput 1965;19:297–301.
[33] Nussbaumer HJ. Fast polynomial transform algorithms for digital convolution.
IEEE Trans Acoustics Speech Signal Process 1980;28(2):205–15.[34] Knuth DE. Seminumerical algorithms. The art of computer
programming. Reading, Massachusetts, USA: Addison-Wesley; 1997.
[35] Nussbaumer HJ. Fast Fourier transform and convolution algorithms. New
York: Springer; 1982.
[36] Schönhage A, Strassen V. Schnelle multiplikation großer zahlen. Computing
1971;7(3–4):281–92.
[37] Lepoint T, Naehrig M. A comparison of the homomorphic encryption
schemes FV and YASHE. Cryptology ePrint archive, report 2014/062. http://
eprint.iacr.org/; 2014.
[38] Chen Y, Nguyen PQ. BKZ 20: better lattice security estimates. In: ASIACRYPT.
Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 7073. Springer; 2011. p. 1–20.
[39] Erlich Y, Lauter K, Wilbanks J. Encrypting genetic data for smarter sharing.
AAAS 2014 annual meeting press brieﬁngs. <http://new.livestream.com/
AAASmtg/Sunday> (minutes 12:52–16:20); 2014.
